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Introduction
In comparative law, it is often said that the law of countries of the East Asian legal
family is markedly different from Western conceptions of law. For example, while
Western countries prefer a ‘struggle for law’ with winners and losers, in East Asia
personal relations and networks are often seen more important. However, there
have been some challenges of this position. For example, Bruce Aronson – an
expert on Japanese law – suggests that ‘[o]ur perceptions of Japan, related to (…)
a preoccupation with cultural explanations, may hinder, rather than aid, careful
analysis of Japanese law and its impact on society’; thus, he proposes that we
should ‘treat Japan as a ‘normal’ country that has both similarities to and differences
with other advanced societies’.1)Bruce E. Aronson, B.E. (2014), ‘My Key Phrase for
Understanding Japanese Law: Japan as a Normal Country…With Context’. Michigan
State International Law Review, 22, p. 815.
An analogous dialectic can be applied to the Chinese Social Credit System. Some
observers emphasise its uniqueness, also calling it a ‘great innovation’2)Backer,
L.C. (2017), ‘Measurement, Assessment and Reward: The Challenges of Building
Institutionalized Social Credit and Rating Systems in China and in the West’, In:
Proceedings of the Chinese Social Credit System, Shanghai Jaiotong University,
23 September 2017, p. 15., or – from a critical perspective – equating it with an
‘Orwellian nightmare’. Taking the position of Chinese exceptionalism, it may be
argued that it would be inappropriate to apply Western notions of virtue or justice
(e.g., by Aristotle or Hannah Arendt, see the contribution to this debate by Reijers; or
by Rawls, see the contribution to this debate by van’t Klooster).
This blog post – and the corresponding paper on which it is based – suggests
that it is preferable to regard it as specific instance of a wider phenomenon. In this
respect, China may be considered as a ‘normal country’ that starts experimenting
with rating-based forms of governance, as the main section of this post will explain.
This position does not imply an uncritical perspective, given that any rating system
operates in a regulatory context; reflecting on the question also addressed in the
other blog posts of this debate (e.g., by Reijers, van’t Klooster), the final section of
this post will suggest that whether or not these systems present a ‘dystopian future’
depends on their regulatory environments.
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Variants of Social Credit Systems in Both China and
the West
Generally, three versions of the Chinese Social Credit System can be distinguished:
China-wide blacklists, compliance scores by pilot cities, and social credit scores
by financial institutions. Details are beyond the scope of this blog post, and they
also feature in some of the other blog posts of this debate (van’t Klooster). It should
also be noted that many of those elements are a moving target. For example,
the local schemes are deliberately used to experiment with different forms of
ratings, in particular in the input data that may be considered (e.g., whether these
mainly include violations of the law or also other behavioural data). As regards the
scores by financial institutions, Western observers focus on the Sesame Credit
scores which consider not only financial credit records but also, for example,
personal information and social relationships; yet, these scores are now about to
be incorporated in a scoring system by the People’s Bank of China with the precise
scope not yet decided.
In the West, many countries know financial consumer credit scores or ratings, and
recent years have also seen a proliferation of rating systems in relation to online
platforms and in the ‘sharing economy’, such as eBay, Uber and Airbnb. Recent
innovations reflect the availability of novel sources of data. A subject’s use of social
media or indeed of sharing economy sites can, for instance, be used as a proxy
for creditworthiness. Thus, an Australian scheme for alternative (and significantly
cheaper) deposits on rented properties, Trustbond, makes use of both types of
data; a Singapore-based lender, Lenddo, claims to use ‘non-traditional data…
to economically empower the emerging middle class’, which includes various
social media sources; and a US firm, Tala, operates in developing nations in Africa
and Asia, claims to utilise up to 10,000 ‘data points’ such as social media and
smartphone use, in order to create a new type of credit score to the advantage of
lower-income customers. There have also been forms of aggregation: for example,
Traity (a former partner of Trustbond) explains its role as assisting users to ‘gather
… reputation from different data sources so that [they] can control it, own it, and
leverage [it]’.
Comparing China and the West, some specific parallels can also be identified. For
example, as part of the Social Credit System, China uses blacklists of persons
who have violated the law in order to exclude them with the help of data sharing
from many aspects of social life. This may be related to the use of background
checks and ‘no-fly lists’ in the US3)Chorzempa, M., Triolo, P., and Sacks, S. (2018),
‘China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of Progress or a Threat to Privacy?’ Peterson
Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 18-14, pp. 4 and 7.; or that in
Israel, codes (based on various data) are assigned to passengers as part of a
distinctive ‘risk-based’ security system.4)See e.g. Jonathan-Zamir, T., Hasisi, B.,
Margolioth, Y. (2016), ‘Is It the What or the How? The Roles of High-Policing Tactics
and Procedural Justice in Predicting Perceptions of Hostile Treatment: The Case of
Security Checks at Ben-Gurion Airport, Israel’. Law & Society Review, (50)608, pp.
616-7. In many countries, criminal records and details of insolvent debtors are also
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collected and may be shared more or less widely in a number of European states.
And even in respect of private sector services (e.g. in the sharing economy), a poor
reputation can exclude individuals from these emerging markets, with far-reaching
consequences for their financial position and their participation in certain aspects of
urban life.
It can also be shown that the design and regulation of today’s rating systems are
already clear examples of policy diffusion. The Chinese system partly derives from
its Western counterparts: the financial credit scoring systems of Western countries
have been an explicit source of influence5)See e.g. Knight, A. (2018), ‘Credit: The
God of China’s Big Data Era’, ECFR China Analysis, p 7., and tools such as the
Sesame Credit scores may be seen as an example of the ‘gamification’ of rating
systems in recent time. In return, the growing global influence of China can mean
that the Social Credit System may well be a regulatory tool which could inspire
the West: it may show that China now ‘appears to have ascended to the position
of principal global driving force in political theory and action’, with ‘the potential to
change law and government as we know them in China and beyond’.6)Backer,
above note 2, at p 2; Dai, X. (2018), ‘Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit
System Project of China’ Working Paper, p. 1. 
Conclusion
Will China’s Social Credit System lead the way to a dystopian future? Our answer
is that this very much depends on the way the Chinese models as well its Western
counterparts evolve. Then, a number of related questions emerge. For example,
could there be mixtures between the Chinese and Western models? If reputation
and rating systems consolidate in Western markets in a similar fashion, what
opportunities, features, controversies, and pitfalls will arise? And how could
lawmakers intervene if this happens?
Crucially, any assessment also depends on the legal and regulatory tools that states
will adopt. Thus, by contrast to the binary distinction suggested in the blog post by
Reijers, we take the position here that it is these tools which determine whether it
may be rather seen as a form of ‘digital republic’ or ‘digital dictatorship’. Technically
speaking, any such regulatory tools either be implemented through the introduction
of a new regulatory regime or the application of general requirements to a particular
context. It may also be unlikely that there will be a single ‘law on ratings’ given the
relevance of many overlapping policy considerations and corresponding fields of
law, such as e-commerce law, privacy and data protection law, anti-discrimination
law, tort law, competition law, sector specific regulation on financial services etc.
However, the growing interest in the regulation of powerful ‘platforms’, as seen in the
recent work of the European Commission, may indicate the type of approach likely to
be favoured in the coming years.
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